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CASES NOTED
TAXABILITY OF GAIN UPON A CONTINGENT FEE
CONTRACT ASSIGNED TO CHARITY
Captain Bonnin, not an attorney, contracted in 1932 to represent
the Ute Indians in their claims against the United States. In 1935, he
assigned his contract to a New York law firm, retaining an interest as
to contingent compensation while continuing to work on the claims. In
1937, the law firm dissolved, but the taxpayer, who was a member of the
firm, continued to represent the Ute Indians. In 1938, the taxpayer pur-
chased from Bonnin 44.79 per cent of Bonnin's remaining contingent
fee for 12,092 dollars. At this time there was much uncertainty as to the
extent of the Indian claims and even greater uncertainty as to whether
the claims could ever be collected. In 1950, almost 32 million dollars was
awarded to the Indians. In 1951, the 44.79 per cent portion of Bonnin's
contingent fee was assigned by the taxpayer to charities. In the same tax
year, the fees were awarded; 1,266,625 dollars was paid to the taxpayer
for his personal services and 191,000 dollars was paid directly to the
charities as a result of the assigned claim. On the issue of whether the
assignment to charity rendered taxpayer liable for income taxes on the
appreciation in value of the claim, held: the increment in value is
taxable income to the taxpayer, and is taxable at ordinary income rates.
Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469 (Ct. Cl. 1962).'
Ordinarily, the making of a gift does not result in the realization of
income. In other words, the donor is not regarded as having sold the
property for its then fair market value. It has become almost axiomatic
that the donation to a charitable organization of property that has
appreciated in value does not render the donor taxable on the apprecia-
tion, although he is granted a charitable deduction for the property's fair
market value at the time of the donation.2 It has been recognized that
1. Another issue in the case involved the fees Wilkinson received for his own services
rendered in prosecuting the claims of the Utes. Since these fees were the result of services
rendered over a period of seventeen years, he elected to have them taxed as if they had
been earned ratably over the seventeen years (under Section 107(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939). Section 23 of the 1939 Code allowed a maximum of 15 per cent of adjusted
gross income to be deducted for charitable contributions purposes. On the issue of whether
the amount used for computing the maximum 15 per cent limitation was the adjusted
gross income before the spread-back provisions were applied, or after they were applied,
held: taxpayer was allowed to compute the allowable charitable deduction on gross income
before the spread-back for purposes of computation of tax liability. This holding has been
substantially codified by Section 1307(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which was
added by the Revenue Act of 1962.
2. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954). Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 Cum.
BULL. 297 states that satisfaction of a pledge by means of a donation of a gift of prop-
erty which has appreciated in value does not give rise to a taxable gain. The event which
gives rise to the deduction is the actual payment of money or the transfer of property.
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this result was within the contemplation of Congress at the time it
enacted the charitable contributions section.' Usually only "capital
assets" are the subject of gifts to charity, and no question arises as to
the non-realization of income upon the making of the gift.4
In general, amounts realized from the sale or exchange of capital
assets held for more than six months are taxed at capital gains rates.'
"Capital asset" has been defined by the Internal Revenue Code as
"property held by the taxpayer,"6 with certain exceptions.7 It would seem
to follow, then, that any "property" not included in the enumerated
exceptions would qualify as a "capital asset." However, courts have
been giving a restricted meaning to the term "property."8 Therefore, if
the item cannot be classified as "property" it cannot qualify for capital
gains treatment.
Generally, amounts received from a personal service contract do not
qualify for capital gain treatment.' Most courts have excluded these
contracts on the rationale that no "sale or exchange" was involved upon
realization of the profit, rather than basing their decision on whether the
asset is "property" or a "capital asset."'" Since a "sale or exchange" is
3. L.O. 1118, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 148 (1923); Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 297,
298 recites: "It would be inconsistent to treat such payment or transfer as a 'contribution
or gift,' and at the same time as a satisfaction of a debt with the tax consequences which
would ordinarily follow from the use of appreciated property . . . to pay a debt."
4. Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 223.
5. INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 1201. All further references to sections will be sections
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
6. Section 1221.
7. Section 1221 lists the following as specific exceptions to the general rule that the
term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with
his trade or business):
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would prop-
erly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of
the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in
his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar property,
held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for
the purpose of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in
part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of the person
whose personal efforts created such property;
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or busi-
ness for services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph
(1) ; or
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a State or
Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or of the District of Columbia,
issued on or after March 1, 1941, on a discount basis and payable without
interest at a fixed maturity date not exceeding one year from the date of issue.
8. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28
(1941) ; Arnfeld v. United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 277, 287, 163 F. Supp. 865 (1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 943 (1959) ; Martin Charles Ansorge, 1 T.C. 1160 (1943).
9. Cotlow v. Comm'r, 228 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1955).
10. Helvering v. Oak, 313 U.S. 247 (1941); Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436
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required for capital gain treatment, courts have excluded these contracts
from this tax benefit.
Anticipatory assignments of income (as opposed to assignments of
capital assets) have been consistently held taxable to the assignor, under
the "fruit-tree" doctrine of Helvering v. Horst." In that case (which
concerned a gratuitous intra-family assignment), Justice Stone stated
that "fruit is not to be attributed to a different tree from that on which
it grew,"12 and that therefore, if one earns income and assigns it to
another before it is collected, the assignor will still be taxed on the
proceeds. In an arms-length transaction, the assignor of a personal service
contract is taxed on the consideration received, and the assignee is taxed
on any amount ultimately collected under the assignment in excess of
his cost.13
The novelty of the Wilkinson case is that the court found realiza-
tion of income resulting from assignment of an asset to a charity. It
based its decision on the premise that only a capital asset qualifies for
the benefits of non-recognition of appreciation in value. 4 It held that
since the asset involved (the right to legal fees) was not "property," and
since only "property" can be a capital asset, Wilkinson could not dis-
regard the appreciation in value in computing his taxable income.'
The government tried to apply the "fruit-tree" doctrine, claiming
that even though the charities ultimately collected the legal fees, Wilkin-
son should be taxed with them. The court rejected that argument, holding
that all of the cases construing that doctrine arose in the context of
gratuitous, intra-family assignments, rather than from arms-length
bargaining transactions.' Here, the court said, the income to be earned
(1939); Jones v. Comm'r, 306 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1962); Cotlow v. Comm'r, 228 F.2d 186
(2d Cir. 1955) ; Ogilvie v. Comm'r, 216 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1954); United States v. Burrows,
133 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1943); Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Galvin
Hudson, 20 T.C. 734 (1953); Pat N. Fahey, 16 T.C. 105 (1951); Mary E. Wenger, 42
B.T.A. 225, aff'd 127 F.2d 523 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 646 (1942).
11. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). This case involved the gift to taxpayer's son of negotiable
interest coupons which were detached from the bonds. In holding the interest derived
from the coupons to be taxable to the taxpayer, Justice Stone made the observation
quoted in text accompanying note 12 infra. This has become known as the "fruit-tree"
doctrine, and has precluded capital gains treatment of anticipatory assignment of earnings.
The doctrine has been applied in most cases where income-shifting through gratuitous
assignments was attempted.
12. Id. at 120.
13. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940) ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
14. Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469, 473 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
15. Ibid.
16. The attempt of the government and the courts to extend the application of the
"fruit-tree" doctrine has been criticized by at least one writer: "[TIhe metaphor has been
substituted for rational analysis to the point where a critic in this area frequently cannot
see the forest for the fruit trees." Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignment to Avoid
Federal Income Taxes, 64 YALE L.J. 991 (1955).
[VOL. XVII
CASES NOTED
was attributable to Bonnin rather than to Wilkinson. "Taxpayer, in a
bona fide sale, purchased the right to receive this income if and when it
became due."17
Was the court correct in determining that Wilkinson should have
been taxed on the appreciation in value of his gift? To analyze the deci-
sion logically, we must examine the nature of the "property" involved.
Wilkinson purchased someone else's right to a contingent fee in a claim.
According to the evidence, at the time Wilkinson bought Bonnin's inter-
est for 12,092 dollars, there was much uncertainty as to the extent of the
Indian claims and even greater uncertainty as to whether the claims
could ever be collected.18 As the years passed, and the claims were per-
fected, the uncertainties diminished. However, not until some twelve
years later did Wilkinson see his patience rewarded. The court seemed
to believe that income, rather than capital appreciation, was being
realized through the passage of time.'" It looked to the nature of the
"property" in Bonnin's hands, rather than in the taxpayer's. Judge
Whittaker in his dissenting opinion questioned the validity of this
approach when he said:
This was not a gift of income that had been earned by the
plaintiff; it was never plaintiff's income; it was Bonnin's income.
Plaintiff became entitled to it by purchase, and not as com-
pensation for his services. 20
It seems more logical to analyze the nature of the property as it
stands in the hands of the taxpayer, rather than in someone else's hands,
and this approach is used in other areas of taxation.2
17. Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469, 472 (Ct. CL. 1962).
18. Ibid.
19. In looking at the "actual and practical occurrences of this particular instance" the
court stated: "[T]he accretion in value of the contract right was due mainly as the result
of taxpayer's own efforts and performance of his personal services." Wilkinson v. United
States, 304 F.2d 469, 474 (Ct. Cl. 1962). The validity of this conclusion is questionable
because taxpayer was fully compensated (1,266,625 dollars) for his own services. The
191,000 dollars in question arose solely out of his purchase. True, if the legal services had not
been performed, the purchased claim would have remained valueless. But what difference
does it make that he was the lawyer in the case? As far as the purchased claim was con-
cerned, he had to do nothing further. Someone else could have done the legal work. If he
had not been fully compensated for his legal services, there would be room for the argu-
ment that the increase in value of the claim constituted payment for his services, but this
was not the case here. A good analogy would be the situation of a fully-compensated officer
of a corporation buying a few shares of his company's stock. It might be easy to show
that the subsequent increase in value of the stock was due to the officer's diligent efforts,
but no one has gone so far as to claim that the subsequent sale of the stock should result
in ordinary income.
20. Id. at 479.
21. In determining whether taxpayer is a dealer or an investor, the courts look to the
activities of the taxpayer. Curtis Co. v. Comm'r, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956); Di Lisio v.
Vidal, 233 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1956). In computing "amount realized" in year of sale
for purposes of installment reporting of realty sales, the purchaser's mortgage is not con-
1963]
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The court seemed to base its decision on practical grounds rather
than legal principles, and cited an example of a loophole which would
be opened were the case to be decided otherwise.2 2 The decision hinges
on whether the claim would have qualified for capital gains treatment
upon sale, and this in turn upon whether the claim qualified as "property."
Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner" was a landmark case restricting
the definition of "property" for income tax purposes. That case involved
the purchase of "futures" by a manufacturing concern in order to protect
its competitive position. The court held that while "futures" were ordi-
narily "capital assets," in the hands of this taxpayer they were not.2 4
The application of this approach to the Wilkinson case is illogical, since
the "property" in the Corn Products case was examined from its nature
in the hands of the taxpayer, while in Wilkinson, the "property" was
analyzed from its nature in the hands of someone who owned it twelve
years earlier.
Section 1221 and the regulations thereunder 25 define the term
"capital asset" to include "all classes of property not specifically ex-
cluded." The language is clear and unambiguous. The word "property"
has a fixed meaning in general law. Are the courts doing a service to the
law by an approach which turns property from a fixed into an elastic
concept, contracting or expanding according to what, in the court's
judgment, a capital gain should be? 2' The courts' desire to be vigilant
guardians of the nation's purse-strings is commendable. In the interest
of certainty, however, a better approach might be to have Congress
amend section 1221 to enumerate additional exceptions to the general
rule that "capital asset means property held by the taxpayer."
The Wilkinson case may have a profound effect on future gifts to
charities. Nonrealization of income upon a gift of appreciated property
has been a settled principle of tax jurisprudence since the early days of
sidered as such, while someone else's mortgage given by the purchaser in payment would
be included. Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951).
22. "[T]wo lawyers, each working on a contingent fee contract, might sell to the
other the right to receive payment under their contract for a nominal sum. They would
then aver that the gain realized was a capital gain because it represented gain on the sale
or exchange of property." Wilkinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 469, 472 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
What might at first blush appear to be an appalling loophole under the logical definition of
"property" yields to attack on several fronts under closer scrutiny. First of all, it might be
found that this was a "sham" transaction-that the sale was not a bona fide one. Second,
there does not appear to be a provision made for the lawyer who works on the case to
receive full compensation for his services. It would be quite valid to make a distinction
between payment for services performed and payment resulting from an investment.
23. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
24. Id. at 47.
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(a): "The term capital asset includes all classes of prop-
erty not specifically excluded by Section 1221."
26. As stated by Justice Stone in Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941): "'Draw-
ing the line' is a recurrent difficulty in those fields of the law where differences in degree
produce ultimate differences in kind."
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the income tax laws.17 The tendency of the courts (starting with Corn
Products) to give the word "property" a narrow construction28 should
cause the prudent attorney to take a close look at the nature of the
"property" being assigned to a charity before advising his client that the
assignment will result in no realization of income to him.
CLAUDE L. EICHEL
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
TO A VOID CONVEYANCE OF HOMESTEAD.
A sister sued her brother in equity in 1957 to obtain cancellation of
two deeds executed in 1930. The first deed, which was executed jointly
by the parents, conveyed homestead property held singularly by the
father to the brother. The second deed was a reconveyance of the home-
stead by the brother to the parents to create an estate by the entirety.
Both conveyances were without consideration. The brother contended
that his sister's action! was barred by section 95.23 of the Florida
Statutes,' since the deed reconveying the homestead to the parents had
been of record without adverse claim for more than twenty years. How-
ever, the trial court held the conveyance void as an ineffective attempt
to alienate homestead property without consideration and allowed the
sister's action.2 On rehearing,3 the Florida Supreme Court held, affirmed:
section 95.23 is not applicable to a void deed or to a deed transferring
homestead property in violation of the constitutional provisions' regu-
27. L.O. 1118, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 148 (1923): "On. account of the clear purpose of
Congress in enacting the charitable contributions section and the express language used
permitting a taxpayer to deduct charitable gifts ... , it is not considered that Congress
intended to tax indirectly any unrealized appreciation in the value of property given to
charitable organizations ...."
28. Kaltreider v. Comm'r, 255 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1958) (subdivision case); Pennroad
Corp. v. Comm'r, 228 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1958) (sales of land acquired in .1828); Simonsen
Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 243 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1957) (sales of purchased war surplus wire) ;
Charlie Hilliard, 31 T.C. 961 (1959) (sale of cars used in car rental business) ; Rev. Rul.
58-77, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 118 (deposits retained on containers used by manufacturer in
shipping its products and not returned by customers).
1. FLA. STAT. § 95.23 (1961) provides:
Limitations where deed or will of record for twenty years or more.-After the
lapse of twenty years from the record of any deed or the probate of any will pur-
porting to convey lands no person shall assert any claims to such lands as against
the claimants under such deed or will, or their successors in title.
After the lapse of twenty years all such deeds or wills shall be deemed valid
and effectual for conveying the lands therein described, as against all persons who
have not asserted by competent record title an adverse claim.
2. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal.
Reed v. Fain, 122 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
3. In its original adjudication of the Reed case, the supreme court. reversed the deci-
sion of the district court, but on rehearing the decision of the district court was affirmed.
4. FLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 4.
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